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Tidigare studier har visat att offentligt tillhandahållande av en viss typ av privata varor kan 
underlätta omfördelning då det föreligger asymmetrisk information om individers produktivitet. I 
denna uppsats fokuserar vi på hur skattefinansierad barnomsorg kan underlätta inkomst-
omfördelning mellan högproduktiva och lågproduktiva individer. Vi visar att en optimal icke-
linjär inkomstskatt skall vara beskaffad så att individerna via marginalskatten möter samhällets 
produktionskostnad av att tillhandahålla barnomsorg. I denna mening är inte den offentligt 
tillhandahållna barnomsorgen subventionerad; istället för att individerna betalar för den via 
marknaden betalar de för den via skatten. Att betalningen sker via skatten och inte via marknaden 
är dock av fundamental betydelse för att kunna lösa upp den själv-selektionsrestriktion som följer 
av den asymmetriska informationen. Att betalningen sker via skatten istället för via marknaden 
innebär att en extra börda drabbar en högproduktiv agent som låtsas vara lågproduktiv, vilket gör 
imiterande mindre attraktivt. Vi visar även att offentligt tillhandahållande av en privat vara kan 
vara strikt förbättra för alla parter även om preferenserna för barnomsorg och arbete är 
heterogena.     
 
Abstract 
There is a well established case for public provision of certain private goods when the 
government pursues income redistribution under asymmetric information about the skill levels of 
the agents of the economy. This paper highlights the role of tax funding of day care for children, 
which is a striking example of a valid case for public provision. We demonstrate that the optimal 
income tax should face all agents with the (social) cost of the day care they need in order to earn 
further income. In this sense day care should not be subsidised. It is simply paid for via the tax 
bill. However, such a payment scheme, rather than a day care fee, is crucial for alleviating the 
self-selection constraint of the asymmetric information, non-linear income tax model, as it 
imposes a burden of paying for superfluous day care on a mimicking high-skilled agent. Also, 
deviating from conventional preference assumptions, we show that heterogeneity of preferences 
for work and day care does not invalidate the Pareto improving properties of this kind of public 
provision.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The labour force participation of females has increased dramatically in all developed countries 
over the last 50 years. For example, in US the labour force participation for married women with 
children under 6 increased from around 12% in 1950 to around 63% in 2000 (Blau and Currie 
2003). In Sweden in 1950 the labour force participation was 20% for married women aged 25-29 
and 15% for married women aged 30-39 (Silenstam 1970, table A:15). In year 2000 for women 
with children under age 7 the labour force participation was 75% for women aged 25-34 and 82% 
for women aged 35-44 (AKU 2000)
 4. Concurrently various forms of day care have developed. At 
early stages it was not uncommon that employers helped to organize day care. In the Nordic 
countries publicly financed and operated day care centers have over time increased in importance 
and are now the most common form of day care. For example, in Sweden 85% of children in ages 
2-5 are in day care.
5  To a substantial part (80-85%) this child care is publicly financed. In US 
day care is also common. According to Blau and Currie (2003): “For good or ill, the majority of 
children in the U.S. and many other high-income nations are now cared for many hours per week 
by adults other than their parents and school teachers”. Much of day care in US is privately 
financed and produced. However, there is an ongoing debate about the quality of private day care 
and a trend towards an increasing share of publicly subsidised day care. Blau and Currie state that 
one third of the costs of childcare for children under 6 is paid for by government subsidies.   
  The figures above show that day care is of great importance and, it seems, is becoming 
increasingly so. Given this large quantitative importance there are several questions of great 
interest to study. For example, how does child care, and the quality of it, affect child outcomes? 
There is a fairly large literature on this topic. The US literature is summarised in Blau and Currie 
(2003).  How is the labour supply of females affected by various forms of day care? This is 
studied by, among others, Blau and Robins (1988), Gustafsson and Stafford (1992), Ribar (1995) 
and Powell (2002). Two important and interrelated questions are whether day care should be 
privately or publicly financed, and whether it should be privately or publicly produced. The 
literature on publicly provided goods as a means to promote redistribution provides a reason for 
publicly financed day care. Several authors have demonstrated that there is a strong case for 
public provision of certain private goods in an economy in which individuals have homogeneous 
                                                 
4 It is not possible to get data using the same definitions for 1950 and 2000. 
5 Calculated from tables 62 and 500 in Statistisk Årsbok 2003.   2
preferences but differ in skill levels.
6 What has received less interest is how the tax system and 
publicly provided day care interact. It is this question we will address. How should the income 
tax be designed? Should there be a fee for using day care or should it be financed entirely by 
taxes. To what extent should the households be confronted with the cost of day care? In the 
course of our analysis we shall provide precise answers to these questions.  
The pros and cons of publicly versus privately financed day care have been a much 
debated issue and the development of publicly provided day care in, say, Sweden has not been 
unquestioned. For example, in popular debate it has been argued that taxes for low income people 
in Sweden are higher than in most other countries, allegedly with harmful effects. It has also been 
argued that low income people that do not want day care are made worse off because of the 
public provision they do not really want. We will study if these claims are correct.  
As a vehicle for our analysis we will use the modified two-type, optimal income tax 
model of Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982) based on Mirrlees (1971). A non-linear, redistributive 
income tax is imposed under the asymmetric information that knowledge of who is high-skilled 
and who is low-skilled is private information not available to the government. The tax schedule 
must then be designed subject to the self-selection constraint ensuring that a high-skilled person 
does not select an income point intended for the low-skilled person. If the high-skilled person 
were to mimic, he would obtain more leisure than the low-skilled person with the same income 
as, being more productive, the high-skilled person could earn the same income in less time. 
However, if some of the transfer is given in kind, it may be of less value to the mimicker than to 
the genuine low-skilled type if the good being transferred is less beneficial to someone who 
enjoys more leisure. Shifting to a transfer in kind may therefore make mimicking less appealing, 
and thus alleviate the self-selection constraint and enhance welfare. Day care for children may be 
a striking example of a good suitable for this purpose as a person who works less will need less 
day care. By pretending to be low-skilled, the high-skilled person will pay the same tax as the 
low-skilled person, but will obtain a smaller benefit in return. Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) 
highlighted day care as an example of a private good that would be well suited for public 
provision, but details were not discussed. It turns out that there are special aspects of day care that 
makes a specialized study of interest.  
                                                 
6 Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), Besley and Coate (1991), Blomquist and Christiansen (1995, 1999), Boadway 
and Marchand (1995), and Cremer and Gahvari (1997) are a few studies showing the benefits of public provision of 
certain private goods.     3
In view of the previous assumption of homogeneous preferences and the Swedish 
(Scandinavian) debate it is appropriate to ask: Does heterogeneity of preferences invalidate the 
mechanism, implying that public provision of day care is merely of theoretical, not of practical, 
interest? The argument is that if the public provision level is set so as to fit the low-skill person 
with a high preference for the publicly provided good, the low skill person with a low preference 
for the good comes out worse than in a system without public provision. In this paper we take this 
critique seriously and investigate if a public provision scheme can be constructed so that we 
obtain a strict Pareto improvement when going from a pure tax/transfer system to the public 
provision scheme even if preferences are heterogeneous
7. 
In line with the Stern-Stiglitz approach we assume that there are two skill groups, high-
skilled and low-skilled individuals. The low-skilled group is assumed to consist of people with 
heterogeneous preferences: some with a strong preference for leisure, reflecting a strong wish to 
have time available to spend with the children, and some with a weak preference for leisure, 
reflecting that they are more inclined to pay for child care. Each agent chooses how much labour 
to supply and the corresponding consumption level, which depends on the tax liability
8. A fixed 
number of children must be cared for either by the parents themselves or by day-care centres. We 
realize that parents might want to have a child in day care while going to the dentist, going 
shopping etc. However, as a stylized fact we think it is reasonable to assume that the need for day 
care equals the hours of work. Hence, in the following we assume that parents do not want to 
have the children at a day-care centre for more hours than they work and that the need for 
externally supplied day-care is equal to the number of working hours. 
As in the conventional two-type model we assume that the government imposes a positive 
net tax on the high-skilled agent and makes a transfer to the low skilled types. The transfer may 
be in cash or in kind (in terms of day-care). To discuss what is the optimal tax/day care payment 
scheme our approach will be to assume that day-care is publicly provided free of charge in the 
amount each agent wants. This regime will then be used as our point of departure for further 
discussion below.  
                                                 
7 There is only a sparse literature on heterogeneous preferences in the context of taxes and welfare policy. For a few 
examples see Sandmo (1993) Tarkiainen and Tuomala (1999), Boadway et al. (2002), and Cuff  (2000). 
8 We perceive each agent as a homogeneous decision maker who may be a single person or a household (couple) 
facing a single wage-rate and only being concerned with its aggregate leisure, consumption, etc.   4
The low-skill individuals have heterogeneous preferences. In some sense we would like to 
treat people in an ”equal way” irrespective of preferences. However, it is not unambiguous how 
to define equal treatment operationally. One could make a case for various definitions. As we do 
not intend to make a contribution to the literature on horizontal equity, we have simply chosen 
one often used definition. The net transfers should be the same to all low-skill individuals 
irrespective of their preferences.
9 Hence, we will assume that for horizontal equity reasons the 
government would like to transfer the same total amount of resources (adding up transfers in kind 
and in cash) to both preference types. This means that if one type receives a smaller amount of 
publicly provided day care, he/she must receive a larger transfer in cash.  
In section 2 of the paper we set up the model we will use. Section 3 contains a description 
of the optimal income tax, whereas section 4 shows how a strict Pareto improvement can be 
obtained by supplementing the tax solution with publicly provided day care. In section 5 we 
characterize the optimal tax/public provision scheme. Section 6 provides a concluding discussion.  
 
2. The Model 
Let 
i Y  and 
i B  denote the gross income and disposable (cash) income, respectively, of a person of 
type i.  Moreover, let a low (high) skill level, reflected by a corresponding wage-rate, be denoted 
by 
1 w  (
2 w ). The labour supply of type i can be expressed as  /
ii Yw . Low and high-skilled types 
are labelled by superscripts 1 and 2, respectively, and a strong preference for leisure is indicated 
by a superscript s and a weak preference for leisure by a superscript w.  Since the distinction 
applies only to low-skilled persons in our model, we note that it is sufficient to apply a single 
index to these agents, eg s means strong preference for leisure and (implicitly) a low skill level. 
A consumer has preferences over consumption, which is equal to disposable income net 
of the amount spent on day-care, and leisure, which includes time spent with (and looking after) 
the children and other time for housework, relaxation, etc. Since every person has the same time 
endowment, there is a unique relationship between working time and leisure and it is a matter of 
convenience whether preferences are expressed as preferences for leisure or for work. We find 
the latter option more convenient and write the direct utility function as  (,) uCh= (, ) uCZ L −  
where  Z  is the time endowment, L is leisure, and hours of work, h, is given by  L Z h − = . We 
                                                 
9 This is basically the same definition of horizontal equity as used by Jordahl and Micheletto (2002) and earlier by 
Bossert (1995) and Allingham (1975).   5
denote the resource cost of day care by p per unit. In a situation without publicly provided day-
care the consumption level of type i is then
i i i i w pY B C / − = . It follows that if day-care must be 
purchased in the market, we can write the utility function of a type i individual as 
(/ , / )
ii i i i uB p Y wY w − . Following the convention of suppressing 
i w  in the latter argument, we 
write the utility function as ( / , )
ii i ii UB p Y w Y − . 
For a fixed wage rate we can depict an indifference curve in Y,B-space (omitting 
superscripts) as done in Diagram 1 below. An increase in Y will, for a fixed wage rate, provide a 
measure of increased labour supply, and the curve will tell us the corresponding increase in 
disposable income that is needed to compensate for the increase in labour supply taking into 
account both the disutility of labour and the cost of day care incurred when more labour is 
supplied. An s-type will obviously have an indifference curve that is steeper than that of a w-type 
through any given point in Y,B-space as a stronger preference for leisure means requiring a larger 
compensation to offset the additional disutility from working more.   
If day care is publicly provided free of charge, the relevant utility function is 
(, /) (,)
ii i iii uBY w U BY = . It is still the case that the s-type has the steeper indifference curve as 
compared to the w-type.  We assume that type 2 has the same preferences as the w-type.  
We assume the standard single crossing property that for any fixed gross and net income 
point in Y, B-space the indifference curve of a low ability type of person is steeper than that of a 
high ability type. The difference in steepness of indifference curves between the two preference 
types is obvious by the assumption about preferences.  
 
3.  The Optimal Income Tax when there is No Public Provision  
As a starting point we consider the income tax optimum without public provision. This optimum 
tax problem is, with a few qualifications, analogous to that of Stiglitz (1982) and Stern (1982). 
The approach is to assign to each person a bundle of gross and net income that implicitly defines 
the tax schedule (as for each gross income the difference between gross and net income defines 
the corresponding tax). An essential feature of the problem is asymmetric information between 
the respective tax payers and the government about the individual skill levels (wage rates). The 
implication is that the income points assigned to the respective agents must be chosen subject to 
the self-selection constraint that no agent could gain by selecting the income point intended for   6
some other agent – described as ’mimicking’ of the other agent. The standard assumption is that 
the tax policy pursues redistribution from high-skilled to low-skilled to the extent that the 
effective constraint is to avert mimicking by the high-skilled. The efficient tax policy is the one 
that maximises the welfare of the low-skilled for any utility level assigned to the high-skilled and 
subject to the self-selection constraint and the government budget constraint. In our problem we 
also have to add the horizontal equity constraint that the two types of low-skilled agents receive 
the same transfer.   














We choose not to pursue the analysis of the optimum tax solution algebraically, but present it 
graphically using diagram 1.  We start by pre-assigning some utility level to the high-skilled 
agent such that  ) , / ( Y w pY B U − =
2 V  and draw the corresponding indifference curve in Y,B-
space. In order to maximise the resources available for the low-skilled subject to this utility 
constraint, the tax collected from the high-skill person is maximised. Hence we assign point A to 
the high-skilled person. This is the point on the selected indifference curve where its slope is 
equal to unity, and the vertical distance from the depicted 45-degree line from the origin, which 
measures the income tax, is maximised. This point has the property of a zero marginal income tax   7
for the high-skilled type.



















== − = , which is the marginal rate of transformation between 
net consumption C and gross income Y allowing for the fact that  w p/  is the day care cost 
incurred by a person earning an additional unit of gross income.   
The tax collected is denoted by 
2 T . This amount can be transferred to the low-skilled 
persons. For simplicity we normalise the size of the high-skilled group to two and assume the low 
skilled group is of the same size split equally between the two preference types.  Imposing the 
condition that both receive the same net transfer, they each receive T
2.  For the moment confining 
attention to the pure budget constraint, the feasible points would be along the dotted straight line. 
Ideally we would like each low-skilled type to be assigned a point of tangency between the 
budget line and an indifference curve, and the person with weak preferences for leisure would be 
assigned a point further to the north-east than the person with strong preferences for leisure. If for 
both persons there are such points of tangency to the left of point B  we have a situation of first 
best. It is not of interest to study this situation any further.    
The interesting cases are those in which the information constraint comes into play, and 
we have as a binding self-selection constraint that no low-skilled person can be assigned a point 
to the right of B, because then the high-skilled agent 2 would get a higher utility level by 
mimicking. The two interesting alternatives are i. the tangency points with indifference curves 
along the budget line occur to the right of point B for both persons or ii.  the point of tangency for 
the person with weak preferences for leisure is to the right of B,  and the tangency for the person 
with strong preference for leisure is located to the left.   
In the former case there will be bunching of both low-skilled types at B. The marginal rate 
of substitution between B and Y denoted  , BY MRS  (slope of the indifference curve) differs between 
individuals. Employing the usual measure of marginal tax rates as one minus the  , BY MRS  (cf. 
footnote 9), the person with the weaker preference for leisure would face a higher marginal tax 
than the person with stronger preferences for leisure. Also, the consumption bundle would be less 
                                                 
10 The standard approach in the absence of day care is to equate the marginal rate of substitution to the marginal 
income net of tax, i.e. ) ( ' 1 / Y T U U B Y − = −  by which the marginal tax rate is implicitly defined.   
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distorted for the person with strong preferences for leisure.  In case ii there would be separate 
points for the two types of low-skill persons. This is the case illustrated in the diagram. The low- 
skilled person with a strong preference for leisure would be undistorted ( , BY MRS  = 1) and face a 
zero marginal tax at income point C. The person with a weak preference for leisure would be 
distorted and face a positive marginal tax at income point B ( , BY MRS  < 1).  There would be a 
binding self-selection constraint in both cases, and either the consumption-leisure bundle must be 
distorted for both types (the former case), or the consumption-leisure bundle for the weak 
preference type must be distorted (the latter case).  
 
4.  A Pareto Improving Public Provision Scheme 
W e  w i l l  n e x t  s h o w  h o w  a  s t r i c t  P a r e t o  i m p r ovement can be obtained by introducing public 
provision of day-care being financed by (increased) taxes.  In case i., when the low-skilled 
persons are bunched at income point B,  the story is basically the same as it would be, had 
preferences been homogeneous.  In the optimal tax situation the demands for day care are given 
by: 
11 1 /
sw x xx Y w == = , 
22 2 / x Yw =  and 
12 /
m x Yw = , where 
m x  denotes the demand of the 
mimicker.  We cannot tell whether 
1 x  is smaller or larger than 
2 x , but we know that 
2 m x x <  and 
1 x x
m < . We let individuals get the amount of day care they want/need and decrease the after-tax 
incomes by 
1 px  and 
2 px , respectively. Hence, the situation for the actual persons is unchanged. 
However, the mimicker is forced to pay, via taxes, for more day care than he needs and hence 
suffers a loss of utility, implying that the self-selection constraint will no longer bind. This means 
that we can change the income point for the low-skill individuals to a point where their 
consumption-leisure bundle is less distorted. Hence, we can improve welfare for both low skill 
persons without hurting the high-skill person.  
The situation is slightly more complicated in case ii.  Since the mimicker mimics the low-
skill person with weak preferences for leisure the demands are given by 
1 /
ss x Yw = <
1 /
ww x Yw = , 
22 2 / x Yw =  and 
2 /
mw x Yw = . As above 
2 m x x <   and 
mw x x < . As 
before, the actual persons receive free of charge the amounts of day care 
w s x x , a n d  
2 x . The after 
tax incomes are decreased by the amounts 
w s px px , and 
2 px . These changes will leave the 
consumption bundles, and hence utilities, of all actual persons unchanged, but the mimicker’s 
consumption, and hence utility will decrease as he is forced to pay in the form of taxes for more   9
day care than he needs.  Hence the self-selection constraint is no longer binding, implying that 
there is scope for changes in the tax system such that utility increases for at least one person 
without decreasing for the others. One such change would be to make the consumption-leisure 
point for the low-skill person with a weak preference for leisure less distorted.  A technical 
question; could it be that the high-skill person would like to mimic the low skill person with a 
strong preference for leisure in the new situation where there is public provision of day care? It is 
easy to show that this is not the case. The income point for the low skill person with a strong 
preference for leisure was not attractive  to mimic in the optimal tax solution. The rebundling of 
the after tax income, so that part of it comes in the form of publicly provided day care, makes the 
point even less attractive to mimic. 
In our experiment we have imposed the condition that both low-skill persons should 
obtain the same net transfer, i.e., the sum of the cash transfer and the value of the publicly 
provided and received day care should be the same for the two low-skill types.  The total amount 
transferred from the high-skill person is constant. Hence the net transfer to each one of the two 
low-skill types does not change. In case ii of the optimal tax solutions referred to on p. 7, the 
transfer to the person with a strong preference for leisure comes in an undistorted form in the 
optimal tax solution. Hence, it cannot be improved by the public provision scheme. As the 
experiment is set up the low skill person with a strong preference for leisure neither gains nor 
loses by the provision scheme. If we abandon the condition that both types should have the same 
net transfer, we could design a public provision scheme such that both low skill types gain. In 
such a scheme the low-skill type with a strong preference for leisure would be favoured in the 
sense that he obtains a larger net transfer than the weak preference type. 
 
5. Characterization of the Optimal Tax-Public Provision Optimum 
There can be two types of optima. One possibility is bunching of the two low-skill types. As 
noted above this situation is quite similar to the case with homogeneous preferences, which has 
been the topic of earlier studies on publicly provided private goods. We consider the non-
bunching case to be the more interesting one and focus on such an optimum, i.e, an optimum 
where the two low-skill types are allocated different points.     
  To characterise the Pareto optimal policy we assume that the policy maker maximizes a 
weighted sum of the utilities (with weights 
s α and
w α )  for the low-skill groups subject to a   10
required minimum utility level (
2 U ) for the high-skill group, the self selection constraint, the 
government budget constraint and the requirement that the net transfer to the two low skill groups 
be the same. (Since we have imposed the condition that both types of low-skilled persons receive 
the same net transfer the relative size of 
s α  and 
w α  is of no importance for the solution as long 
as both weights are positive.)  
Given these assumptions the Lagrange function of the optimisation problem will take the 
form:  
(,) (, )
s sss w www UB Y UBY αα Λ= + ( ) ( )
22 2 2 , UB Y U λ −−                             (1)         
) ) , ( (
2 U Y B U
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The first constraint (with Lagrange multiplierλ ) is the minimum utility requirement for the high-
skilled person. The second restriction (with multiplierβ ) is the self-selection constraint that the 
utility that the high-skilled person can obtain by mimicking the low-ability person (with weak 
preference for leisure) must not exceed the utility level actually intended for him. The equality of 
transfers to the low-income persons is captured by the third constraint (to which σ has been 
assigned). The last constraint (with shadow priceµ ) gives the budget constraint. (For the sake of 
the derivations below note that when differentiating w.r.t.
i B , the first argument of the utility 
function is 
i C  and that we always have 
i i B C ∂ ∂ / =1 for the respective values of i.) 
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where ) /( σ µ β ρ + =
m
C U ,  C Y U U MRS / − = , and the inequality follows because   
0 < −
w m MRS MRS , which is the standard assumption that the high-skilled type has the flatter 
indifference curve through any given point in Y,B-space.  
According to conditions (2) and (3) the labour of the high-ability person, and also the 
labour supply of the low-skilled agent with a strong preference for leisure are undistorted. Since 
resources must be allocated to day-care, every hour of work inflicts a real cost of  p  on society, 
which should be reflected in the budget constraints to provide the right incentives for labour 
supply and making sure that MRT MRS = in terms of consumption and leisure. This is exactly the 
contents of conditions (2) and (3). The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between gross and net 
income on the left hand side expresses the compensation in terms of consumption required to 
offset the disutility from earning an additional unit of gross income. In other words, this is a 
money measure of the marginal disutility of acquiring further income. According to (2) and (3) 
the marginal disutility (MRS) should be equated to the extra income actually generated after 
deducting the cost of day care. Since the latter is a necessary social cost, the right hand side does 
in fact express the net social income generated by work effort at the margin. Thus the condition is 
equivalent to the first best efficiency condition, and there is no distortion. It follows from (4) that 
the type of person with weak preference for leisure has a marginal disutility of acquiring further 
income, which is less than the net social income that can actually be obtained. Hence the labour 
supply is distorted downwards. 
It is of interest to interpret these findings further in terms of marginal tax rates. For this 
purpose it is helpful to distinguish between a gross and a net tax concept, where the latter is 
defined net of transfers to the consumers in terms of day care provision. The rationale is that a 
transfer can be perceived as a negative tax. We write the gross tax function as  ) ( ) ( Y B Y Y T − =  
and the tax net of the public day care provision as  w pY Y T w pY Y B Y Y / ) ( / ) ( ) ( − = − − = τ . The 
corresponding marginal tax rates are T’(Y) and  '( ) Y τ , where  '( ) '( ) / YT Yp w τ = − . Employing the 
usual measure of marginal tax rates in the Mirrlees-Stern-Stiglitz tradition we can define T’(Y) as 
1- , BY MRS  and  '( ) Y τ  as 1- , CY MRS . As observed from the optimality conditions (2) and (3) the 
marginal net tax rate is zero for these two types of agents, whereas their marginal gross tax rates 
become: 
 
2 2 / ) ( ' w p Y T =   (5)      and       
1 / ) ( ' w p Y T
s =       (6)    12
 
respectively. That is, the marginal income tax should not be zero but should be equal to the 
marginal cost of day care implied by agent i earning an additional unit of gross income. The 
implication is that these persons face the same marginal prices as in a situation with no public 
provision of day care. Even if true that the individual obtains day care “for free” from the public 
sector, it is still the case that the individual acts as if he were facing the real cost of day care 
provision. They simply pay for it via their taxes. Hence, for the actual person two the optimal 
tax/public provision scheme faces the individual with exactly the same budget constraint as in the 
system where day care is bought in the market and where he is relieved of a tax burden 
corresponding to the cost of his need for day care. 
One may then ask what difference it makes whether day care is publicly or privately 
funded. The answer is that is makes a crucial difference with respect to mimicking. If a person of 
type two were to mimic, his tax payment would cover the cost of the day care of the low-skilled 
person, which would exceed his own need. While it is true that the tax pays for the day care that 
people actually need at their optimum income points, it pays for more than the day care needed 
by mimickers, which imposes a cost to mimicking. Note also that an individual of type two is 
likely to complain and argue that he would prefer a system where one does not pay for day care 
via the taxes. He would like a system with lower tax payments and all day care purchased in the 
market. The reason is that in such a system he could mimic, obtaining a tax relief exceeding his 
cost of day care as a mimicker. However, if the political majority are adamant to retain the 
previous redistribution, steps would have to be taken to prevent such behaviour, and a Pareto 
inferior situation would arise as compared to a regime with public provision of day care. Hence, a 
public provision system, improving upon the market solution, is likely to have the property that 
some people would like to have it differently in the hope of escaping the burden of redistribution. 
The consumption-leisure bundle of the low-skilled group with weak preference must be  
distorted in order to prevent these agents from being mimicked. Their marginal income tax is: 
 
  1 / ) ( ) ( ' w p MRS MRS Y T
m w w + − = ρ         (7) 
 
and the marginal tax net of the day care cost is: 
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We see that the marginal effect on total tax payments, taking account of the transfer in kind, is of 
the same form as the marginal income tax in the pure income tax system. However, now there is 
an additional term, 1 /w p , in the expression for the marginal income tax. Also the low-skilled 
person with a weak preference for leisure now pays via the tax bill for the day care he obtains, 
and the marginal (social cost) of providing day care is reflected in the marginal income tax.  
Hence, for all actual persons public provision makes the cost of obtaining day care no different 
than if it were purchased in the market. In either case the consumers face the real cost of day care, 
as is socially desirable since day care is a true cost of supplying labour. The market price and the 
extra tax, perceived as earmarked for day care, yield the same labour market disincentives. Only 
if a person were to mimic, would the public scheme be different than a market system as a 
mimicker, via the tax system, would be forced to pay for an amount of day care equal to that 
demanded by the low-skill person with a weak preference for leisure, and exceeding the need of 
the mimicker. This is the crucial property of the public provision system as it is indeed the 
capability of alleviating the self-selection constraint that is the very justification for the public 
provision in our context.   
 
6. Discussion and Extensions 
Taking as point of departure the insight that public provision of day care can mitigate the self- 
selection constraint in an optimum tax model, we have shown that heterogeneity in preferences 
does not invalidate the usefulness of publicly provided day care in this respect. More importantly, 
the paper has demonstrated that the optimal tax should be designed so as to face the taxpayers 
with the real cost of providing day care. In that sense public provision does not imply subsidised 
day care. Surprisingly, although it seems straightforward once stated, this result has not been 
observed before. A reason why this appears as a clear-cut result in our paper is that the demand 
for day care is assumed to be strictly proportional to work effort and gross income.  
  Beyond the introduction of heterogeneous preferences, the present analysis deviates from 
a number of previous, related analyses in several respects. i) Previous studies have not assumed 
that the publicly provided good is a perfect complement with labour. ii) It has been a common 
assumption that there is only one public provision level. iii) It has often been assumed that the 
consumers may top up their consumption of the good in question in the market or even opt out to   14
rely solely on acquisition in the market
11. We may note that to the extent that consumers top up or 
opt out the situation is similar to the one described in our model in that the agents encounter the 
full cost of the good under survey as reflected by market prices or taxes. An issue addressed in 
previous work is whether a good partially provided by the public sector should be 
taxed/subsidised.
12 We note that in our present model, as far as we consider the actual situation of 
the two types of persons, there is no separate role for a commodity tax (subsidy). As day care is a 
prerequisite for working the only thing that matters is the net wage obtained after tax and after 
paying for day care. However, with respect to the mimicking problem it makes a crucial 
difference whether a day care centre charges a fee, or it is paid for via the tax bill. If there is a fee, 
a mimicker will escape part of the fee as compared to the low-skilled person simply by 
demanding less day care. There is no similar escape from taxes as they are determined by income 
rather than working hours, and by definition the mimicker and the mimicked earn the same 
income. Hence we can conclude that child care should be fully tax financed, but people should 
still face the true marginal cost of labour market participation as reflected in the marginal income 
tax. 
  We have addressed public provision of day care, but the same kind of analysis and results 
may apply to other, often publicly provided, goods for which demand is labor elastic. Health care 
and education for one’s children are examples that easily come to mind.  To the extent that the 
marginal tax burden pays for publicly provided goods that would otherwise be purchased in the 
market, this part of the marginal tax is equivalent to a market price (assuming no cost difference).  
  In the introduction of this paper we noted that in popular debate in Sweden it has been 
argued that taxes, both total and marginal, for low income people are much too high, with 
allegedly harmful effects. We can use the analysis of this paper to comment on this.  When trying 
to relate our results to conditions in Sweden it is a problem that we in our model just have two 
ability levels. It is well known that the zero marginal income tax result for the high ability type is 
due to the fact that there is a finite highest ability level. When there is no finite highest ability 
level we do not really know what the marginal income tax at the top should be.
13  It is less 
                                                 
11 See Blomquist and Christiansen (1998a). 
 
12 See Blomquist. and Christiansen (1998b). 
 
13 Diamond (1998), using strong functional form assumptions, try to characterize the marginal income tax at high 
skill levels when there is no upper bound for the skill level.   15
problematic to relate the results for a low-skill person with real data.  Since there is a clear mode 
in the distribution of wage rates at the bottom part of the distribution we think this mode can be 
used as an empirical value for the low-skill wage. Using this mode, simple back of the envelope 
calculations indicate that for low income individuals,  1 /w p  amounts to something like 30-35% if 
we assume one child is in day care.  Hence, this part of the marginal tax can be interpreted as a 
payment for day care. Beyond this there is, according to formula (8), an additional term 
) (
m w MRS MRS − ρ reflecting the distortion that is needed to deter mimicking.  
If we in this simple exercise set the wage for a high-skilled to double the wage of a low-
skilled, a rough estimate of 
2 /w p  would be in the order 15-18%. Hence, even if we do not really 
know what the marginal tax net of the day care provision should be for a high skill person, we 
know that for high skill persons with children in public day care there should be a component of 
their marginal income tax reflecting the social cost of day care amounting to an order a little more 
than 15%. 
Hence, we find that for low skill individuals with children the marginal taxes in Sweden may 
very well be in accordance with what optimal taxation theory prescribes, given that there is 
publicly financed day care. Lower marginal income tax rates would be inefficient as they would 
induce too large labor supply. 
We realize that the following statement might be controversial. However, our analysis 
shows: i. there is a gain in efficiency if publicly financed day care replaces day care bought in the 
market ii. in an economy with publicly funded day care it is not only reasonable, it is indeed 
necessary for efficiency that marginal income tax rates are higher than in economies where day 
care is purchased in the market. Hence, it might very well be that economies with higher marginal 
tax rates have less severe distortions than economies with lower marginal tax rates. One cannot 
judge the distortions generated by a tax system in isolation, one must also consider the 
expenditure side. 
The discussion above has (tacitly) assumed that the tax payer has a single child. If there 
are more children in the household the marginal cost of working longer hours is larger as there 
are more children to pay for in day care. This means that an even larger share of the marginal tax 
rate reflects a cost of day care rather than a distortion, indicating that our ”back of the envelope   16
figures” above are on the lower side.
14 Families with children face the same tax schedules as 
others but receive free day care. Of course, one interpretation of this is that families with children 
face another tax/transfer schedule than others, but that part of the after tax income comes in kind 
in order to deter mimicking. This would then be an example of what Akerlof (1978) named 
tagging of income. If a needy group could be identified the tax breaks should be geared just to 
this group and not to everyone. 
 
Appendix  
Departing from the Lagrange function (1) standard first order conditions are derived. 
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and 
                                                 
14 With households supporting different numbers of children one might in general have different tax schedules 
contingent on the number of children, but we shall not pursue the more general issue of household taxation (see e.g. 
Cremer et al. (2003) and Schroyen (2003 )).     17
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